Crew-Coordination

[petersutch]

Hi,

 

ich habe folgende interessante Zeilen zum Thema

 

Captain contra F/O. (im Hapag Kontext)

 

Viel Spass beim Lesen.

 

>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><

 

Captain is flying,

 

 

P1: I will start descent by 50nm from point Romeo.

P2: OK Captain.

P2: Shall I call KHATMANDU Tower to get you the latest?

P1: Yes.

P1: Descent checklist.

F/E: Read it all.

P2: How´s your weather (KHAT-MANDU Airport W/D 090/10k 5000m 6/8 2000)

P1: OK.

P2: Captain we lost the VOR DME.

P1: It´s OK I am using the Doppler DME.

P2: But Captain this is not approved for the approach

P1: It´s OK don´t worry I have been coming to this airport for the last 20 years since the turbo and we used to come overhead and make spiral descent etc.

P2: But Captain we are below the MEA and I think the mountain ahead is shielding the VOR DME, don´t you agree with me?

P1: No, you worry too much.

P2: KHATMANDU Tower, please confirm that your VOR DME is serviceable?

TWR: Affirmative, you are cleared for approach.

P2: Roger and for your information we have flags on both VOR/DME.

TWR: I confirm both are operative.

P2: Captain I am positive that you are low and the mountain ahead is shielding the VOR/DME signal.

P1: No.

P2: Captain I am verry worried.

P1: ...

P2: [i looked outside and I saw the river wich is before the mountain and I was very sure we were low and going towards the mountain.]

P1: ...

P2: For God´s sake go up to safe altitude and you can do whatever you want with me after landing.

P1: ...

P2: Go around Thrust F14. [i pushed the 4 throttles and instructed the F/E to select F14]

P2: Captain climb to 13500ft now.

P1: ......[Just followed what I said without saying anything]

P2: Here is the mountain, just ahead see I said we were going to hit it. [We had seen the mountain by the time we passed 11500ft above cloud.]

Anyway, we continued the approach because when we climbed we vectored VOR/DME and our height now is proportional to "XXX height DME". After landing the Captain thanked me and said SORRY.

 

Therefore, when a Co-Pilot has the choice between his life or his licence and job, choose your life and do what is necessary.

 

APPENDED: Sketch showing Khatmandu Airport, river, mountains, point ROMEO etc.

 

 

 

 

... and more

We were flying at FL370 over the Alps, I was a B727 F/O and everything was normal that night until we started flying over the mountains, then we started to encounter light turbulence increasing in intensity. With the increase in turbulence the attitude of my Captain changed, and here is the story that happened.

 

Capt: I hate turbulence.

F/O : Me too.

Capt: Ask ATC to change FL.

F/O : Geneva ... request to change FL due turbulence.

ATC : OK ... descent to FL330.

At this time turbulence increased to moderate. The Captain throttled back and started descent, the aircraft started to pitch up and move/yaw/roll just about any attitude you can imagine and I wasn´t sure wether it was the turbulence or pilot-induced due nervousness?! However what really matters is that the Captain throttled back at FL370 and I saw the nose going to 20 degrees pitch up and here is the conversation.

 

 

F/O : Pitch, pitch.

Capt: OK

Captain put nose down 15 degrees. At this time the aircraft was so fast the MNO bell started to ring.

 

 

F/O : Speed

Capt: OK. (and he put the nose up 20 degrees to reduce speed, and throttles still idle at FL330).

F/O : Watch your pitch, Captain you will stall. Pitch, pitch, power add power you will stall.

Capt: Stop shouting, don´t shout, shut up.

F/O : If you don´t add power I will keep on shouting.

Capt: It´s OK.

Anyway the rest of the flight was almost silence especially from my side. Finally, to let you know, if we stalled from FL370 over the ALPS I don´t think we would have recovered!!

 

These two reports represent somewhat extreme examples of the general problem of maintaining good crew co-coordination. Events that seem almost incredible when written down in black and white really do happen. The problem is that pilots don´t stop being people when they get on to the flight deck; they take with them the bits of pride and prejudice that we all carry about in everyday life.

 

Reading CHIRP reports such as these suggests that there are four main factors that are important in understanding crew relationships, and these are personality, seniority, capacity, and perceived ability. To take a rediculous example, it is clear that if we take a Captain with a dominant personality, lots of seniority (perhaps a training Captain), who is actually handling the aircraft, and who the First Officer perceives to be able, it´s clear that a submissive, junior, non-handling, First Officer with a brand new CPL is not going to be very likely to challenge the Captain. This was just about the situation in a Twin Otter in Canada a few years ago - the F/O got no response from the Captain to the approach checks, but didn´t like to challenge him because he knew he was in a bad mood. In fact, the Captain had died of a heart attack, and the aircraft flew into the ground with no intervention from the F/O.

 

One can´t help wondering what would have happened in the two reports above if the First Officer had been rather less assertive. The unassertive F/O and dominant Captain pairing is not the only problem, however, as there are plenty of accidents and CHIRP reports that illustrate the two Captain problem in which comment from one to the other may be inhibited because Captain A does not wish to appear to challenge the competence of his peer, Captain B. There are even examples in which Captain A will let Captain B go ahead and make a horlicks of something just so that he can score a few points off him.

 

It´s asking a lot, but pilots really should prepared to bury their pride when on the flight deck and behave in the way that they know to be relational, even if this means admitting a mistake, asking for advice, or taking a chance on upsetting somebody. When in doubt, speak out. At least you´ll be alive to be fired.

 

 

[FalconJockey]

Das hab ich vor ein paar Tagen bei EUCARE auch schonmal gelesen. Hast Du es auch von dort?

[petersutch]

Richtig,

 

habe ich vergessen dazu zu schreiben.